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Professor Morton and Professor Booker point out several in-
consistencies which exist between the intended purposes of the
Federal Securities Acts and their actual effect. Originally the Acts
were meant to stimulate financing of American business by restoring
the investor confidence lost during the Great Depression of the
1930's. The Acts require the issuer to disclose information con-
cerning his reliability and his business purpose as the means of
protecting the small investor. Ironically, this attempt to increase the
flow of capital has actually hindered investment because trading in
securities is viewed by the SEC as speculation which must be curbed
rather than recognized as the primary purpose of the Acts. The
authors argue that buying and selling securities should be recognized
for what it is - speculation - and encouraged because it channels
risk capital into business development. They show that the data
which the Acts require to be disclosed obscures more than it informs.
They argue that effective small investor protection means the SEC
should give up its disavowal of any evaluation of the worth of
securities and make a complete critique available to the public. The
authors close by suggesting that recognition of these paradoxes will
help the present regulation of securities marketing evolve into a
more realistic and effective system.
j A TOOL a screwdriver, as its name indicates, is designed to
do one job - drive screws. It may be used for other tasks with
varying degrees of effectiveness. It can open cans, stir paint, chip
ice, chisel and even cut wood. But it does those tasks secondarily
and not as well as it does the task for which it was designed. It is
designed and made to drive screws. The Federal Securities Acts' as
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'The Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1964)
[hereinafter referred to as the 1933 Act) ; and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
48 Stat. 881, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-jj (1964) [hereinafter referred to as the
1934 Act]. [Where the two acts are referred to as a legislative plan or scheme the
reference will be to the Acts.]
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a legislative plan are designed (according to the Securities and Ex-
change Commission) to elicit the "truth in securities." In fact the
early descriptions of the law in legal writings and even in reported
cases called the law the "truth in securities" law. Loss refers to the
underlying philosophy of the two acts as the "disclosure philosophy"2
and cites President Roosevelt's message to Congress in 1933 as his
authority.' Like the screwdriver, the Federal Securities laws can do
other things besides make issuers and dealers disgorge the truth.
They can regulate the markets, provide investor protections, stabilize
prices, control the people who deal in securities, and even determine
the terms upon which securities can be sold, but the thing they should
do best is elicit the material facts.
Many authors think and write in terms of the Federal Securities
Acts as being products of the Great Depression, which hit its low
point between 1932 and 1934.' However, this is not quite accurate.
The problem of the Depression in 1933 was not that investors were
being defrauded by misleading information and that a federal law
to protect them was necessary. The problem of the Depression was
that people with money had lost confidence in the securities markets
because of the stock market crash of 1929. It was to regain this
confidence that the Securities Acts were created.
There had been cries of need for federal regulation of corpora-
2 1 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 127 (1961).
3 I recommend to the Congress legislation for federal supervision of traf-
fic in investment securities in interstate commerce.
In spite of many State statutes the public in the past has sustained
severe losses through practices neither ethical nor honest on the part of
many persons and corporations selling securities.
Of course, the federal government cannot and should not take any action
which might be construed as approving or guaranteeing that newly issued
securities are sound in the sense that their value will be maintained or that
the properties which they represent will earn profit.
There is, however, an obligation upon us to insist that every issue of
new securities to be sold in interstate commerce shall be accompanied by full
publicity and information, and that no essentially important element attend-
ing the issue shall be concealed from the buying public.
President Roosevelt's message to Congress, Mar. 29, 1933, H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d
Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1933).
4 From 1920 to 1933 some $50 billion of securities were sold in the United
States. By 1933 half were worthless. In 1934 the American public also held over
$8 billion of foreign securities, of which $6 billion had been sold in the
years 1923 to 1930. By March 1934, $3 billion were in default. The aggre-
gate value of all stocks listed on the New York Stock Exchange on Septem-
ber 1, 1929, was $89 billion. In the break of September and October they
fell by $18 billion. In 1932 the aggregate figure was down to $15 billion -
a loss of $74 billion in two and one-half years. The bond losses increased the
total drop in values to $93 billion. Whether any legislation could prevent
another such catastrophe is beside the point; it is a simple fact that the
developments of 1929-1932 brought the long movement for federal securities
regulation to a head.
1 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 120 '(1961).
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tions and corporate finance for many years prior to 1929.' However,
during this period most states had blue sky laws' already on the
books,1 and the preference for state regulation was stronger. But far
more important, the pre-1929 market was a rising market where all
the losses suffered by investors were made up in the next wave of
buying, and consequently not enough people were hurt to make the
problem one of pressing public necessity. When the market crashed
in 1929, the number of people who held equity or debt securities
had risen to the point where the markets were no longer the exclu-
sive stomping grounds of the robber barons of the 1870's nor those
crafty traders who made money both on the rise and fall of the
market." The general public had entered the market in sufficient
numbers to be an effective moving force on the politicians. Neverthe-
less, this was not the dominant factor in bringing about the Securities
Acts. If it had been, then the Acts would have been written and pro-
moted by political hacks instead of college professors, prominent
s With almost every session of Congress, to say nothing of the forty-eight
state legislatures, the topic of security frauds blithely recurs. No complaint
can at least be made upon the quantity of current legislation on the subject.
Measured merely by their length, bulk and number, America has enough
security laws to last for another century at least. Meanwhile security swin-
dling goes on, even in the states where the distribution of securities is most
drastically regulated by statute.
Meeker, Preventive v. Punitive Security Laws, 26 CoLUM. L. REv. 318 (1926).
During the period from 1900 to the advent of World War I, every
President recommended to the Congress that legislation be enacted which
would give the federal government control over corporations engaged in
interstate commerce. The more far reaching of these proposals contemplated
that corporations engaged in interstate commerce would be required to be
federally chartered. No regulatory legislation was enacted, however, until
the national emergency created by World War I when, in order to direct
the flow of capital into channels which would best support the war effort,
a Capital Issues Committee was established.
The necessity for this Committee disappeared at the end of World
War I, and it was abolished. When it was dissolved it filed a report which
recommended that, "federal supervision of security issues, here undertaken
for the first time, should be continued by some public agency . . . in such
form as to check the traffic in doubtful securities while imposing no undue
restrictions upon the financing of legitimate industry."
Gadsby, Historical Development of the S.E.C. The Government View, 28 GEo.
WASH. L. REV. 6-7 (1959).
8 "They are called 'Blue-Sky Laws' because they stop the sale of stock that represents
nothing but blue sky -nothing terrestrial or tangible." Cook, "Watered Stock" -
Commissions - "Blue Sky Laws" - Stock Without Par Value, 19 MICH. L. REv. 583,
590 (1921).
A definition of "Blue Sky Law" is necessary. The State of Kansas, most
wonderfully prolific and rich in farming products, has a large population of
agriculturists not versed in ordinary business methods. The State was the
hunting ground of promoters of fraudulent enterprises; in fact their frauds
became so barefaced that it was stated that they would sell building lots in
the blue sky in fee simple. Metonymically they became known as blue sky
merchants, and the legislation intended to prevent their frauds was called
Blue Sky Law.
Mulvey, Blue Sky Law, 36 CAN. L.T. 37 (1916).
7"By 1933, every state but Nevada had some sort of blue sky law on the books."
Cowett, Federal-State Relationships in Securities Regulation, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
287, 289 (1959).
8 H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1933).
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lawyers and statesmen.9 The terms used to convince the Congress
of the need for protection for the small investor were those pictur-
ing widows and orphans losing their life savings to goldbrick sales-
men. In 1933, this specter was so common in the minds of the
general public, that little more than slight reference was needed to
conjure up an emotional picture of desperation caused by crooked
securities salesmen.
While this emotionalism may have moved those subject to
pulls of the heartstrings or the votes of the losing public, it was,
objectively, so irrelevant to the actual problem that it could hardly
have been the motivating force of the thoughtful and responsible
proponents of the Acts. Their goal was to restore investor confi-
dence in the securities markets because the source of funds for financ-
ing American business had dried up to a mere trickle. It was in-
vestor confidence they were after, not protection of helpless and
defenseless people.
The late James M. Landis, who was Professor of Legislation at
Harvard Law School in 1933, was asked by Felix Frankfurter, then
a Harvard Law Professor also, to help write the 1933 Act for the
congressional committee then working on it. Looking back over the
years, Landis wrote,
The act naturally had its beginnings in the high financing of
the Twenties that was followed by the market crash of 1929. Even
before the inauguration of Franklin D. Roosevelt as President of the
United States, a spectacularly illuminating investigation of the nature
of this financing was being undertaken by the Senate Banking and
Currency Committee under the direction of its able counsel, Ferdi-
nand D. Pecora. That Committee spread on the record more than
the peccadillos of groups of men involved in the issuance and mar-
keting of securities. It indicted a system as a whole that had failed
miserably in imposing those essential fiduciary standards that should
govern persons whose function it was to handle other people's
money. Investment bankers, brokers and dealers, corporate directors,
accountants, all found themselves the object of criticism so severe
that the American public lost much of its faith in professions that
had theretofore been regarded with a respect that had approached
awe.10
The peccadillos of the Twenties seem little worse than the
manipulations of the nineteenth century. It was not that the mis-
deeds of the market operators and corporate financiers were much
worse than in previous periods, but simply that the crash of 1929
affected more than a small sector of the American economy. It in-
fected the economy of the whole world. Business activity had receded
to the point where the Government had to do something to get the
9 Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 29 (1959).
10 Id. at 30.
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engines of industry turning. The whole structure of our polity
contorted itself, twisted, turned, writhed and wriggled, never to be
the same again- just to get the nation's economy going again.
One of the major factors necessary for recovery was public con-
fidence in the economic outlook and in the business prospects of the
country. Many felt it would be revived if there were better protec-
tion than the ordinary common law protections for the investor, and
if the Federal Government had the power to control, oversee and
regulate the securities business.
While there were state controls on the law books at the time,11
these state acts were never very effectively administered nor financed
by the states and by their local nature could not have an overall na-
tional effect. What the country was seeking was a scheme, national
in scope, that would be uniform in application.
At the time there were three general theories of securities regu-
lations: (1) anti-fraud; (2) notification (registration) ; and (3)
qualification.
The anti-fraud type of legislation prohibits fraudulent practices
as criminal and gives the private citizen a right of action as well.
Sales may be made without any required action on the part of the
governing agency or the issuer. The acts operate retrospectively,
coming into play after the issuer or a broker or dealer has done some-
thing that is prohibited, but the naked sale of the securities is never
wrong.
Anti-fraud legislation is predicated upon the general criminal
theory of deterrence and is as effective as the example of punishment
can be. It is not open to argument that the deterrent effect of pro-
spective punishment has never eliminated crime and never will re-
gardless of the severity of the punishment. Almost all states have
some anti-fraud provisions.12
The notification type of law depends upon disclosure as its
effective force, and permits the issuer great freedom and latitude.
Reduced to their bare essentials, such laws require the issuer to file
a statement of who he is and what he intends to do. He may then
issue and sell unless the governing agency takes prescribed steps to
stop the issue. The notification theory does not include any evalua-
tion of the worth of securities nor does it require the issuer to obtain
a license. All it requires of the issuer is the filing of a statement;
without it sales of securities are prohibited. Once a notification or
1 Cowett, supra note 7.
12 "Thirty-nine other statutes -in every blue sky jurisdiction except California,
Idaho, Maine, Montana, New Hampshire, North Carolina and Wyoming - contain
assorted antifraud provisions. These provisions operate independently of the registra-
tion features." I L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 42 (1961).
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registration is filed and no action taken by the governing agency,
there is nothing to prohibit the sale of the securities. This is the
theory the Federal Securities Acts have followed, and it is the most
common for the states' acts.
The qualification theory is the most stringent and restrictive.
It prohibits the sale of securities without the permission of the gov-
erning agency. By requiring a license for the securities the agency
is in a position to refuse to issue the license unless it considers the
securities sound.
The Federal Securities Acts are nominally of the notification
type and were originally predicated on that concept. President Roose-
velt in his message to Congress recommending the legislation not
only espoused the notification theory but specifically negated any
idea of qualification when he said:
Of course, the Federal Government cannot and should not take
any action which might be construed as approving or guaranteeing
that newly issued securities are sound in the sense that their value
will be maintained or that the properties which they represent will
earn profit."3
The notification theory depends upon disclosure as its effective
force, both in supplying the information which is used to notify the
authorities and the data upon which investors will rely and in having
a deterrent effect upon possible fraud.
14
Disclosure is the cornerstone of federal securities regulations."
The Acts were predicated upon and built around the idea of dis-
closure as the key to the proper balance between protection from
fraud and freedom of investors to make legitimate business mistakes.
Professor Loss says, "Congress did not take away from the citizen
3 H.R. REP. No. 85, supra note 3.
14 "Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial disease. Sunlight
is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman."
L. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND How THE BANKERS USE IT 92 (Stokes
ed. 1914).
When I came to the S.E.C. I thought the philosophy of disclosure had been
fully depleted. Increasingly, however, I am convinced that in a pluralistic
society- where as in business enterprise so many forces are operative-
disclosure is the most realistic means of coping with the ever present prob-
lem of conflicts of interest. In some instances our conduct is motivated by
what we think is right, without regard to anything else. But, perhaps,
equally as important, ethical behavior (and wise counseling) often results
from estimating the public's reaction to full knowledge of a planned course
of conduct.
The requirement of disclosure in certain instances - and its possibility
always- is thus the most important regulatory force in our society.
In other words, disclosure restrains because of sensitivity to public re-
action, and caution about response to the dividend shareholder and the possi-
bility of legal action. I firmly believe that disclosure does operate in this
deterrent manner.
Cary, The Case for Higher Corporation Standards, 40 HARv. Bus. REV. 53, 54
(1962).
15
J. HAZARD & M. CHRISTIE, THE INVESTMENT BuSINEss 298 (1964).
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'his inalienable right to make a fool of himself!' It simply attempted
to prevent others from making a fool of him."18
It should be fairly clear at this point that the real purpose in
1933 and 1934 in enacting the Federal Securities Acts was to stimu-
late the financing of American business and government by restoring
the public confidence in the markets, and the tool by which the Acts
were to do this was disclosure. The Acts have certainly accomplished
their purpose; American business has been financed and in turn has
supplied the capital for a substantial portion of the rest of the world.
However, the idea of financing business has long since left the field
as a goal and the concept of investor protection has entered to re-
place it. Then Chairman Cary of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission summarized the present philosophy of the Commission in a
few well chosen words in his letter to Congress accompanying the
SEC Special Study of 1963 where he said:
The functions of this report and of any changes proposed are to
strengthen the mechanisms facilitating the free flow of capital into
the markets and to raise the standards of investor protection, thus
preserving and enhancing the level of investor confidence.'
7
While Professor Cary gives lip service to the idea of "facilitat-
ing the free flow of capital into the markets," there is nothing in
the SEC report to indicate that there is any concept of making it
easier to obtain capital in the market place. All the recommendations
in the report suggest ways to tighten up laxness and close up loop-
holes in the law which, of necessity and by design, make the task of
obtaining money on the market that much more difficult. By remov-
ing from actual consideration the goal of facilitating the flow of
capital, the goal of investor protection is left as the single main
thrust of the Securities and Exchange Commission and of the Federal
Securities Acts. Who, then, is an investor and does he need the pro-
tection of the SEC and all the laws? Is an investor any person who
holds a security?
In general and with much overlapping there are four types of
holders of securities. They are management, distributors, investors
and speculators. The distinguishing feature between all these holders
is the view with which they purchase or acquire the securities.
Management acquires its securities for control purposes and the
return it can obtain through control. Sometimes management obtains
debt securities for control purposes. 8 While profit is the motive,
16 1 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 128 (1961).
17 Letter of transmittal from William L. Cary, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Com-
mission to President of the Senate and Speaker of the House of Representatives.
Apr. 3, 1963, in Part 1, REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS OF THE
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.
iv (1963).
18 Management may use convertible securities for control purposes and the indebtedness
of a business in difficulty is a powerful lever for control as well.
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as it is the motive with other holders, management hopes to gain its
profit primarily through salaries, dividends and interest. In addition
management hopes to realize profits by its own efforts in increasing
the value of the securities and consequently the sales price of the
securities. It can hardly be asserted or believed that the federal or
state securities acts were created or are maintained for the benefit
or protection of management. A quick review of the Public Utility
Holding Company Act of 1935,' " a part of this general wave of
reform, should put any doubts on this score to rest.
Distributors acquire their securities for the purpose of resale.
While they do fall within some of the protections of the Acts, no one
would have suggested in 1933 and 1934 that Congress should pass
the Federal Securities Acts to protect underwriters and stock brokers.20
It should be noted here that no distinction is drawn between holders
of equity or debt securities. The view with which a distributor holds
a security is not slanted towards value except as it affects resale
price, and his interest is not to hold the securities for a return. At
any rate the first two categories of holders of securities were not
those parties for whom the Securities Acts were passed. It remains
to be seen whether the last two parties were those for whom the
Acts were passed.
There is a bit of confusion, perhaps because of overlapping of
goals or because of an unclear picture of the security holding popu-
lace, in regard to the distinction between investors, speculators and
gamblers. The term "gambler" is not made a separate category be-
cause the idea of speculation includes the concept of gambling. It
would have been easy to set up a separate classification for the insti-
tutional investors such as insurance companies, trustees, banks, funds
of all kinds, and it would have made sense to do this in 1933. But
this is not 1933, and the situation is not quite the same; institutional
investors buy speculative securities.
Again, it stretches credulity to suggest that the Securities Acts
were passed to protect the institutional investors. Indeed, Landis
19 49 Stat. 838, 15 U.S.C. §§ 79-79z-6 (1935). For a contemporary exposition of the gov-
ernment theory as to the evils at which the act was directed, see R. JACKSON, THE
STRUGGLE FOR JUDICL&L SUPREMACY 247-60. See also, Electric Bond & Share Co. v.
S.E.C., 303 U.S. 419 (1938), in which Jackson led, as Assistant Attorney General for
the United States, and upheld the power of the government to impede very profitable
management investment control techniques. With Jackson were, among others, Cohen
and Corcoran, original drafters, with Landis, of the Securities Act of 1933. See Landis,
supra note 9, at 35.
20 [The Securities and Exchange Commission] encountered both open and under-cover
resistance from brokers, investment bankers, and money powers." R. JACKSON, supra
note 19, at 147.
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maintains that it specifically was not the purpose of the Acts. 2 So
we must remove from that group of security holders for whose bene-
fit the Acts were passed, the institutional investor, that knowledge-
able buyer who acts upon his own knowledge, investigation and
experience.22 It does not matter whether he is investor, speculator,
or a major financial house underwriting an issue or taking a position
in a security for a quick profit.
The speculator could hardly be considered the legitimate bene-
ficiary of the federal scheme of regulation. Tracy and MacChesney
writing in 1934 said:
On examination the complaints made are found to be reducible
to two general heads: one, speculation; two, manipulation. Specula-
tion is regarded as an evil because it is, in effect, mere gambling.
Manipulation refers to dishonest practices of those who use the ex-
changes, whether they be brokers or traders. In discussing the evils
charged against the exchanges and the proposed measures for their
correction, it is well to bear in mind this important distinction.2a
In highlighting this distinction they make it clear that gamblers and
speculators are in the same class, and that they were not the intended
beneficiaries of the Acts.
Reviewing the situation: The Federal Securities Acts were passed
to protect certain holders of securities. Eliminated from the group
of primary beneficiaries are the following classes: (1) management;
(2) distributors; (3) institutional and large knowledgeable invest-
ors; and (4) speculators and gamblers. This leaves only the small
private individual buyer of securities who is incapable of protecting
himself. Apparently he was felt to be the most important factor in
financing American business.
The words "investor," "speculator" and "gambler" are nice
sounds and seem to convey a real meaning, but a closer look is re-
quired to see if they convey the same meaning today as they did
thirty-five years ago and whether they refer to the same parties they
referred to thirty-five years ago. While there are not a large number
of cases that have made and considered the distinctions between these
terms, a few of them are worthy of consideration here for what light
they can shed upon the subject. In examining the distinction between
investment and speculation in a case arising in Oregon the court said:
There is an element of investment as well as an unavoidable element
of speculation in every business in which property, whether tangible
21 "The sale of an issue of securities to insurance companies or to a limited group of
experienced investors, was certainly not a matter of concern to the federal govern-
ment." Landis, supra note 9, at 37.
2"2[B]ureaucracy ... could hardly equal these investors for sophistication." Landis,
supra note 9, at 37.




or intangible, is regularly bought and sold. The "in-and-out" market
hanger-on who buys and sells through brokers on margin is a typical
example of the pure speculator.... On the other hand, an investor
is ordinarily thought to be a person who acquires property for the
income it will yield rather than for the profit he hopes to obtain
on a resale.
2 4
Thus the distinction drawn in this and other cases25 is that the in-
vestor is one who places money in such a way that the prospects are
for little risk of loss and a steady return while the speculator is one
who places money in such a way that there is a prospect of a large
return regardless of the risk involved. To put it in more current stock
market jargon, the investor is concerned with the downside risk while
the speculator is concerned with the upside gain.
To gamble means "To stake money or any other thing of value
upon an uncertain event."26 Gambling is distinguished from speculat-
ing by the legitimacy of the source of the gain. This is well illustrated
by a Georgia court which accepted this definition of speculation:
"The act of speculating, by engaging in business out of the ordinary,
or by dealing with a view of making profit from conjectural fluc-
tuations in the price rather than from the earnings or the ordinary
profit of trade, or by entering into a business venture involving un-
usual risks, for a chance of an unusually large gain or profit.''27
Is the ordinary holder of securities for whom the Acts were
designed an investor? Can it be said today that the ordinary holder
of securities acquires his securities for a prospect of a steady return
over the years? Does he acquire high grade corporate and government
securities for a long pull interest return, or is the prudent small man
concerned with preserving the buying power of his dollar in the
face of an ever increasing inflation? Is the prudent small investor
that man who uses the view of a fiduciary or a trustee in his invest-
ment goals? Or, on the contrary, is he a person concerned not with
return and interest but rather appreciation of capital? If so, is the
widow of today, placing the proceeds of her late husband's insur-
ance policies in such a way as to preserve its real dollar value, a
speculator hoping for a profit on resale?
28
24 United States v. Chinook Inv., 136 F.2d 984, 985 (9th Cir. 1943).
25 " 'Speculation' [is] . . . 'the act or practice of buying land, goods, shares, etc.,' in
expectation of selling at a higher price.' " United States v. Kettenbach, 208 F. 209,
213 (9th Cir. 1913). " 'Invest' means. . . 'to lay out (money or capital) in business
with the view of obtaining an income or profit; as to invest money in bank stock.' "
- 'Speculate'-'to buy or sell with the expectation of profiting by a rise or fall in
price; often to engage in hazardous business transactions for the chance of unusually
large profit.' " Clucas v. Bank of Montclair, 110 N.J.L. 394, 397, 166 A. 311, 313
(1933).
26 State v. Berkman, 79 Ohio App. 432, 435, 74 N.E.2d 411, 413'(1944).
27Martin v. Citizens' Bank, 177 Ga. 871, 876, 171 S.E. 711, 714 (1933) (quoting
Webster's International Dictionary).
28 United States v. Chinook Inv., 136 F.2d 984 (9th Cir. 1943).
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It is submitted that the meanings of these words have changed
sufficiently and the nature of the national economy has changed
sufficiently that the parties whom the Acts were primarily designed
to protect are no longer people seeking to obtain a yield on a safe
purchase but rather are people seeking a rise in value in order to
hedge against inflation. This may have been defined as speculation
at the time the Acts were passed, but it does not change anything
more than the name of the parties who are and should be the primary
beneficiaries of the Federal Securities Acts - the speculators!
As previously pointed out, there is an overlapping area between
the meaning of speculation and gambling. If there be any who would
argue that the Securities and Exchange Commission is concerned with
investing and the flow of capital into the markets and not with super-
vising the biggest gambling operation in the world, he need not look
any further than to the short sale."9 The SEC certainly has the power
to eliminate the short sale from the scheme of "investing" yet it
retains it.30 From the earliest history of the Securities Acts the short
sale has been recognized as a gamble:
There is no question but that a short sale is, in its essence, a gam-
bling transaction, a gamble that the seller can later cover his sale
at a lower price. It does not even bear the semblance of investment
that is always present when the deal is a purchase of stocks.31
Yet, in the short sale the seller intends to deliver the shares he does
not own because he borrows the shares and actually delivers them.
Much law has been written prohibiting the sale of a commodity
with no intent to deliver, 2 and the question of legality of the short
sale was really put to rest only with the passage of the Commodity
Exchange Act. 3 In a commodity futures transaction there is no in-
"[A] 'short sale' [takes place when the) seller has not the stock he assumes to sell,
but borrows it and expects to replace it when the market value has declined." Such
sales are perfectly valid, provided the parties contemplate an actual purchase or actual
sale by or through the broker and not a mere settlement by a payment of differences.
Hurd v. Taylor, 181 N.Y. 231, 73 N.E. 977 (1905).
30 It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange -
(a) To effect a short sale, or to use or employ any stop-loss order in
connection with the purchase or sale, of any security registered on a national
securities exchange, in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest
or for the protection of investors.
48 Stat. 891, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1964).
31 Tracy & MacChesney, supra note 23, at 1028.
32 Legislation, 45 HaRv. L. REV. 912, 916 nn.25, 26 (1932).
342 Stat. 998 (1922), as amended, 49 Star. 1491 (1936), as amended, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-
17a (1964); 68 Stat. 913 (1954), 69 Stat. 375 (1955), 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1964); 70




tent to deliver,8 4 and regardless of terminology it can hardly be
maintained that it is not a gamble. At least when purchasing equity
and debt securities the "long" buyer contemplates obtaining the
bonds or shares and the consequent interest or dividends.
Gambling, as previously defined, has to do with the outcome of
an uncertain event. Manipulation,35 of course, is making that un
certain event certain. If one were to make the course of the market
certain or predetermine the outcome of the market transactions, he
would be subject to investigation for manipulation.
It was stated before that the small investor was the ostensible
beneficiary of the Acts, not the larger investor who could take care
of himself, yet the SEC permits trading in odd lots at a higher com-
mission rate than trading in round lots.3" If, in fact, the Commission
were concerned with the small investor it would not permit this dif-
ferential but rather would make it easier for the small investor to
purchase at the same cost as the larger investor. At a time when
some of the largest American corporations sell from $5,000 per one
34 "Thus trading in futures does not serve primarily to transfer possession of the con-
tract subject matter; rather it involves mainly the assumption of the risk of price
change by speculation, or the shifting of such risk by hedging." Note, Federal Regula-
tion of Commodity Futures Trading, 60 YALE L.J. 822, 825 (1951).
A futures transaction is a standardized contract made on or subject to the
rules of a board of trade in which the seller or "short" agrees to sell and
deliver a specified amount of a commodity in a certain month to the pur-
chaser or "long" who agrees to accept and pay on delivery. Although the
jong can insist on taking and the short on making delivery-which is
effected by the passage of warehouse receipts -upwards of 99% of all
futures contracts are liquidated by purchases or sales of offsetting contracts
in which equal long and short positions are cancelled against each other.
Comment, Manipulation of Commodity Futures Prices- The Great Western Case,
21 U. CHI. L. REv. 94-95 '(1953).
"In practice, however, actual delivery of the commodity seldom occurs; about
99% of the contracts are offset on the exchange by making an opposite futures trans-
action ... ." Campbell, Trading in Futures Under The Commodity Exchange Act, 26
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 215, 217 (1958).
S Manipulation is the setting of security prices by artificial means and the circumven-
tion of normal market action. It is prohibited by the Securities and Exchange Act of
1934, 48 Stat. 889, 15 U.S.C. § 78i and the rules promulgated under that act, 17
C.F.R. § 240, rule 10-b-i and rule 10-b-5. Taken all together the prohibition is that
not only brokers and dealers, but all persons who use the mails or the facilities of a
national exchange may not effect any transaction or use any device or contrivance or
circulate any false or misleading information for the purpose of setting prices. Specifi-
cally prohibited are wash sales, artificial market activity, matched orders, rumor-
mongering, and making false and misleading statements. There are appropriate pen-
alties including the private right of action to anyone who purchased at a manipulated
price including the injured party's attorney's fees and costs. The language of the pro-
hibition is broad enough to encompass "any device, scheme or artifice to defraud."
36 On the NYSE [New York Stock Exchange], common stock shares are sold
ordinarily in units of 100 called "round lots." Preferred stocks, and a few
common, usually have units of 10 for a round lot sale. Any number less
than a round lot, either 100 or ten, is called an "odd-lot" order .... Only
round lots are completed on the NYSE. Odd-lot sales take place technically
off the exchange, although . . . the odd-lot dealer uses the floor of the
NYSE to get an effective round lot price on which to base his odd-lot
transaction.
G. COOKE, THE STOCK MARKETS 73 (1964).
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hundred shares87 to $50,000 per one hundred shares8" it seems to
be contradictory to require a small man to put up large sums to
be able to buy at the same price a rich man does. If the SEC were
concerned with the small investor it would stimulate the odd-lot
purchase rather than penalize the odd-lot as it now does. It is in-
teresting to note that the odd-lot sales do not affect the prices on
the New York Stock Exchange because the odd-lot sales are not
reported except in total number of shares traded during the day and
the odd-lot prices are pegged to the round lot prices.
People have a tendency to believe their own publicity, and the
SEC, being composed exclusively of people, tends to believe its own
publicity. If it begins to think that the fundamental and exclusive
purpose of the Federal Securities Acts is to protect investors, it will
not be long before the concept of "flow of capital" becomes a de-
spised slogan of the opposition. So long as gambling is considered
an undesirable social disease and only permitted by the state for the
purposes of the state, a racing commission can have no other purpose
than to preserve the confidence of the bettors that they are getting
a fair shake and thus raise income for the community by keeping
the game honest. The SEC should view itself in the same light, that
is as an organization created to maintain the flow of capital to Amer-
ican business by means of protecting all the people who "invest"
money in securities. This view of itself by the Commission would
be a change from the present one which appears to be that the is-
suance, distribution, sale and trading of securities are merely per-
missible business activities allowed by the federal scheme of regulation
and not the primary purpose of the Acts.
The foundational concept of securities regulation in the noti-
fication type of law is disclosure. The thought was that proper
disclosure would effectuate the purposes of the Act, so long as the
purposes of the Act are those of protecting the small investor. As
a practical matter, most of the data disclosed by command of the
Acts discloses nothing to the small investor and is not likely to
disclose anything to the small investor. It is doubtful that it is pos-
sible to create a scheme which could possibly disclose either the
whole truth or the material truth to the small investor. Very early
in the life of Federal Securities Regulations, Justice William 0.
Douglas, then a Professor of Law at Yale wrote:
Some, however, have believed, apparently in all sincerity, that the
great drop in security values in the last five years was the result of
37 The current (July 10, 1967) price of one share of American Telephone and Tele-
graph is approximately $51.00. (High 527/8, Low 511/8, Close 515/8).
38The current (July 10, 1967) price of International Business Machines is approxi-
mately $502.00. (High 507, Low 502, Close 5031 ).
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failure to tell the "truth about securities." And others have thought
that with the Securities Act it would be possible to prevent a recur-
rence of the scandals which have brought many financiers into dis-
repute in recent years. As a matter of fact there are but few of the
transactions investigated by the Senate Committee on Banking and
Currency which the Securities Act would have controlled. There is
nothing in the Act which would control the speculative craze of the
American public, or which would eliminate wholly unsound capital
structures....
But even the whole truth cannot be told in such simple and
direct terms as to make investors discriminating. 39
While many kinds of information are required to be disclosed
there is but one major requirement intended to go directly to the
ultimate investor, and that is the prospectus. It arrives for some
strange reason just after the investor has made a purchase.4"
The Securities Act of 1933 requires that a vast amount of in-
formation be accumulated and filed with the SEC as part of the
registration statement. This information is boiled down to a few
dozen pages in an honest and legitimate attempt to present a full and
true summary to a prospective investor. The prospectus is then for-
warded to the purchaser of the securities, not before he makes the
purchase, but after- much as a memento of the sale.4 How can
we expect the average investor with little sophistication to intel-
ligently use it as an aid in making an investment decision?4 Further,
if the prospectus is a device intended to disclose information to
prospective investors, why are the only investors who get a prospectus
before purchase those who are least likely to need it - namely,
3 9 Douglas and Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 YALE L.J. 171 (1933).
40 In particular, while the prospectus must be the first written communica-
tion (other than a "tombstone" ad or an authorized summary prospectus)
in connection with a public offering, the law does not require that it be
delivered before orders for the registered security may be solicited, received,
or even accepted, but only that its delivery precede or accompany delivery
of the security to the customer "after" sale. Even if the customer is not
legally committed to his purchase at (or before) the moment of delivery
of the security to him, he is surely "committed" in the sense of having made
his investment decision well before this moment; yet this may be (and
usually is) his first opportunity to see the prospectus. At this point he can
hardly be said to have derived benefit from the affirmative aspect of the
prospectus delivery requirement, but only from the negative aspect of having
been shielded from any prior written communication not qualifying as a
prospectus.
Cohen, "Truth in Securities" Revisited, 79 Hl-iv. L. REv. 1340, 1350 (1966).
4 1 Lobell, Revision of the Securities Act, 48 COLUM. L. REV. 313, 323 (1948).
42 While personal experiences are not favored in law review articles, yet one of the
authors feels constrained to point out that after a Bachelor's Degree in Business Ad-
ministration, 11 years experience in corporate enterprise including publicly held cor-
porations, a Bachelor of Laws degree, a Master of Laws degree, 15 years dealing in
securities, and three consecutive years of teaching Securities Regulations, he is still
unable to effectively use a prospectus as a tool for making an investment decision.
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existing stockholders who receive a rights offering or an offer
of an exchange?43
The financial statements prepared by independent accountants
included in the prospectus are the usual kind of financial statements
used in businesses all over the world, such as balance sheets and
profit and loss statements., However, most publicly held corpor-
ations' affairs and business transactions are extremely complicated.
To make statements reflect a true picture, they must be explained
further. These explanations are located in the footnotes to the
financial statements. The footnotes, printed in the smallest possible
type, often are longer than the financial statements. Assuming the
issuer has no intent to hide or confuse, the command of the law
that the statements are not to be materially misleading or false
necessarily makes them materially obscure, even to the initiated.
The paradox of disclosure is that every added disclosure tends
to obscure rather than inform. It suggests that perhaps there is a point
of diminishing return, a point beyond which we begin to defeat our
fundamental purpose. Perhaps the required notices that must be
placed in large type on the face of a prospectus are as good an ex-
ample as any. If there were one warning, of any color type, it might
be read, but the front cover of a prospectus is covered with warnings
so numerous and profuse that no one takes time to read them. The
prospectus has become a formalistic legal document. As a bill of
lading is not a meeting of minds, the prospectus is not an induce-
ment to buy.
There are generally two kinds of information which the 1933
Act requires to be disclosed. The first we have discussed - that in-
tended to be disclosed directly to the customer. The second kind is
the information intended to be disclosed to the SEC. This last part
makes up the vast bulk of disclosures required including not only
the registration statement but the periodic reports needed to keep
that data current. While this information is nominally open and
available to the public, the public never actually sees it. A news-
paper article described the manner in which the SEC makes this data
available. "[T]he focal point for much of the essential transfer of
43 Curiously, the prospectus delivery requirement operates at highest efficiency
- in the sense that the required prospectus is certain to be delivered to all
offerees in advance of their investment decisions rather than at the comple-
tion of their purchases - in certain situations where a full-blown prospectus
is probably least needed: a rights offering or an offer of exchange to exist-
ing stockholders. In both cases the very nature of the transaction ordinarily
compels written communication of details of the offer, and therefore a full
prospectus, at an early stage. Yet by hypothesis the offerees are already
stockholders and thus presumably have some familarity with the company
and perhaps with the class of stock being offered, so that "new" items of
information would be relatively few.
Cohen, supra note 40, at 1351.
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financial data to securities buyers is a cramped reference room in SEC
headquarters here that, by actual count, provides just twenty chairs
for America's seventeen million investors. 'What's more, only rarely
is there great demand for the seats."" Even if an interested person
did want some information, a great deal of pertinent data is filed
in a warehouse across the river at Franconia, Virginia, and is not
readily available. Further, if some small investor wanted to copy
some of the disclosures, the article reported it would cost fourteen
cents per page. Disclosure to the SEC is not, in fact, disclosure to
the general public.
If there ever was a situation where the SEC forced a company
into disclosing the truth it was surely the Tucker case." Preston
Tucker created a new enterprise to manufacture automobiles just
after World War II. He raised about $26,000,000 from the public
after disclosing that the automobile to be produced had not been
tested, that there were probably patents needed, that Tucker had
transferred corporate funds to his personal account, and had made
no net cash contribution to the company but instead had already
drained nearly a quarter of a million dollars of its capital to him-
self prior to approval of the registration, that there was pending
litigation, that Tucker had as an associate with him in the venture
a man with a criminal record and an attempt had been made to cover
up this fact, that Tucker had previously violated the Securities Act
in this very venture, and other facts too numerous and detailed
to enter here. Yet, regardless of the facts so stated, Tucker was
able to raise $26,000,000 and ultimately topple into bankruptcy."
No matter what truth is disclosed, you can lead an investor to
a prospectus, but you can't make him read it.47 Moreover, if he is a
gambler rather than an old fashioned investor, even if he could
understand it, it would not be relevant.
If we accept the ideas introduced earlier that the protections
are needed by the small man only, and that he is for the most part
a speculator, then effective small investor protection requires one
of two things: either the complete evaluation of securities by a com-
petent authority so that he will at least get his money's worth or
" Kohlmeier, Informing Investors, The Wall Street Journal, Apr. 17, 1963, at 16, col. 4.
45 In re Tucker Corp., 26 S.E.C. 249 (1947).
46 One may obtain a view of these proceedings by reading In re Tucker Corp., 256
F.2d 808 (7th Cir. 1958). Compare particularly the view argued successfully for the
debtor in the Seventh Circuit as to the management's honest belief in the adequacy of
its working capital for the task in hand (256 F.2d 811) with the grim and specific
warnings by the SEC prior to registration approval, on the same subject, In re Tucker
Corp., 26 S.E.C. 249, 260-61 (1947). Notice also the warning by the SEC as to the
dangers to purchasers of franchises, which the Seventh Circuit case eleven years later
proved to have been painfully accurate. Id. at 252-53.
47 Old Wall Street Proverb.
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conversely adequate supervision of the game so that he can get a
fair deal. If the fundamental purposes of the securities laws are in
terms of investing, then the SEC should evaluate the securities as to
worth. If the fundamentals are in terms of speculation and gambling,
then the SEC should supervise the legitimacy of the game.
In view of the fact that to admit to the concept of the legitimacy
of speculation and gambling would be against a well formulated
public policy, the question of the validity of its converse is raised.
Should the system of federal securities regulation evaluate the worth
of individual securities?
The law does not forbid it, but the examination of the worth
of securities was not a part of the plan nor is it supposed to be a
part of the plan. It is hard to envision an employee of the SEC
whose job it is to examine the registration excluding any personal
evaluation of the worth of the securities offered for sale. Beyond
that, though, one author recently has written:
One of the outstanding accomplishments of the S.E.C. since
its creation has been the "processing" of registration statements, a
phenomenon of great importance that, curiously, is not even adverted
to in the statute. In the interval between filing and effectiveness
of a registration statement - an interval apparently designed to
allow for circulation and absorption of filed information and for
the Commission's use of its refusal order or stop order powers -
an examination of great thoroughness is made by staff members,
and their views are expressed to the registrant in a letter of com-
ments (popularly known as a "deficiency letter") which forms the
basis for the finally amended document.48
This process is at least a partial evaluation of the worth of the
securities. One of the more interesting cases to arise in this connec-
tion involved the Hydramotive Corporation which claimed it filed a
registration statement and that the SEC refused to take it seriously
and ignored it. Some of the material contained in the statement filed
was listed in the reported case as follows:
(1) The present directors do not foresee the possibility of the corpo-
ration ever being in a position to pay any dividends or having any
assets of determinable value. The continued existence of the corpo-
ration is questionable. Bankruptcy may result at any time.
(2) Anyone considering purchase of this security must be prepared
for immediate and total loss.
(3) No representation is made that the possibility exists that the
corporation can continue to exist.
(4) No representation is made in this statement that the President
and Secretary of the Company have any capability that can benefit
the corporation in any way.
(5) In view of the above unfavorable factors, and other unfavor-
able factors in every part of this offering circular, it would appear
4Cohen, supra note 40, at 1353.
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that it is self-evident that any prospective purchaser of Hydramotive
Corporation stock should be prepared for an immediate total loss.
The District Court threw it out as "nothing more than a sarcas-
tic piece of mockery.
' 49
Even the Tucker case was in fact an evaluation of the worth of
the securities involved. The paradox herein is that even while re-
peating over and over that it does not evaluate the worth of secur-
ities, the SEC does in fact do so. The SEC should be concerned to
see that an investor cannot make an investment below a certain
standard of return and can only buy securities of a certain investment
quality." "Compensation or reparation will never serve the same
high purpose as prevention. '51
The state of California does currently evaluate the worth of
securities52 and the idea that the federal system should evaluate the
worth of securities is not a new idea. Justice William 0. Douglas,
in evaluating the idea of a federal system wrote in 1934:
Any comprehensive and consistent control of the type which
these parts of the New Deal envisage must inevitably embrace within
it control over security issues. That in essence means control over
access to the market. That control would be an administrative con-
trol lodged in the hands not only of the self-disciplined business
groups but also in the hands of governmental agencies whose
function would be to articulate the public interest with the profit
motive....
In that type of control we should have something much more
fundamental than the truth about securities.
We should be searching for the elements of soundness and
stability, the absence of which caused most of the things we so fre-
quently attribute to fraud and deceit. At the same time, the require-
ment of the truth about securities would be retained. But it would
be given the secondary and relatively unimportant place which it
deserves.5 3
CONCLUSION
We have attempted here to set forth the rather paradoxical na-
ture of the federal system of securities regulation and the idea that
4
9 Holmes v. Cary, 234 F. Supp. 23, 24 (N.D. Ga. 1964).
5o Joslin, Federal Securities Regulation from the Small Investors' Perspective, 6 J. PUB.
L. 219, 223 (1957).
51 Douglas, Protecting the Investor, 23 YALE REv. 521, 524 '(1934).
52 If the commissioner finds that the proposed plan of business of the appli-
cant and the proposed issuance of securities are fair, just, and equitable,
that the applicant intends to transact its business fairly and honestly, and
that the securities that it proposes to issue and the method to be used by it
in issuing or disposing of them are not such as, in his opinion, will work
a fraud upon the purchaser thereof, the commissioner shall issue to the
applicant a permit authorizing it to issue and dispose of securities, as therein
provided, in this State, in such amounts and for such considerations and
upon such terms and conditions as the commissioner may provide in the
permit. Otherwise, he shall deny the application and refuse the permit, and
notify the applicant in writing of his decision.
CAL. CORP. CODE § 25507 (West 1955).
53 Douglas, supra note 51, at 531-53.
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the resolution of the paradoxes would bring forth a system with less
inconsistencies and a more logical approach to the concept of Ameri-
can capitalism.
The four basic paradoxes we have attempted to set forth are
these:
1. The Federal Securities Acts were designed to stimulate the
flow of capital into business by means of increasing investor pro-
tections, but each added protection is an added stumbling block to
the flow of capital.
2. Gambling is illegal in most places and strongly against pub-
lic policy, yet today the system of buying and selling securities main-
tained for the purpose of channeling risk capital into business is not
really investing but gambling.
3. The concept of disclosure, designed to elicit the truth in
securities, has become so formalistic as to conceal and obscure rather
than disclose.
4. The theory upon which the federal system is predicated is
to protect small investors by means of disclosure, but the only real
protection small investors get is through an evaluation by the SEC
of the soundness and worth of securities.
5 4
54 The practical effects of this paradox are well illustrated by the Tucker automobile
case, discussed supra notes 45, 46. The picture presented is that of a shepherd attempt-
ing, at night, to protect his flock against a tiger - with a flashlight. To the inevitable
slaughter, the light of :isclosure added only the additional horror of perfect awareness
of what was happening and would happen. The sheep were not warned, and the
hungry tiger was not deterred. The genuine and well-founded distress of the shepherd
is clearly preserved in the opinion of the SEC. Notice these excerpts:
Under the Securities Act of 1933, this Commission does not approve
or pass on the merit or lack of merit of any security offered. It is specifically
made a criminal offense under the Act for any person to represent the con-
trary. The Commission's primary function is to require full and adequate
disclosure of all material facts in connection with a public offering of
securities so that investors may, on the basis of such disclosure, arrive at an
informed judgment as to whether or not to purchase the securities offered.
[26 S.E.C. 249.1
Since January 1946, there has been extensive publicity concerning the
Tucker organization and its plans to manufacture a modern automobile. In
many periodicals, newspapers, sales brochures and company advertisements,
which are part of the record before us, there has been widespread comment
as to the radical features the Tucker car possesses, elaborate and conflicting
claims as to its expected accomplishments and performance, and exaggerated
statements as to the funds invested by the management. Many of the state-
ments that have been publicized in the past appear to be grossly misleading
and, in many cases, false. We, cannot ignore the impact of the misleading
information contained in past publicity concerning the corporation and its
officials on the minds of the investing public. Floyd D. Cerf, president of
the underwriter, testified he had no doubt the present issue could be sold
merely on the basis of the widespread public interest that had already been
created.
The contrast between the information contained in previous publicity
and that contained in the prospectus, as it has now been amended, is so
pronounced that we deem it necessary to warn the investing public of the
danger of relying on any past judgment based on prior literature in deter-
mining whether to purchase the securities of the registrant. We urge that
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prospective investors make a careful study of the amended prospectus.
[26 S.E.C. 250-51.]
Preston Tucker has had complete control of the corporation from its
inception. The manner in which the funds of the corporation have been
administered in certain instances raises some grave questions as to whether
a proper stewardship of corporate funds has been consistently maintained.
[26 S.E.C. 253.)
The registration statement, as originally filed, contained no intimation
that further financing might be necessary. This point was considered at
length in the 8(e) examination and in the 8(d) hearing. The amended
prospectus now admits (1) that circumstances may arise which may require
substantial additional funds for working capital purposes, (2) that no plans
have been formulated for the securing of any such additional funds, nor
does the corporation have any assurance of being able to obtain them when
and if they are needed, (3) that if such additional funds become necessary
and are obtained, they may occupy a position senior to that of the Class A
common stock offered under the present registration statement, and (4)
that failure to obtain additional funds, if needed, may result in substantial
loss to purchasers of Class A stock. [26 S.E.C. 260-61.]
Since these amendments appear to have corrected the misstatements
and omissions . . . we have determined to dismiss the stop order proceed-
ings and permit the registration statement, as amended, to become effective.
... In taking this action, we emphasize again that we are in no way passing
on the merit or lack of merit of the securities offered, the registrant's prod-
uct, or the possibility of success or failure of the enterprise. These are
decisions which each investor must make for himself. The limits of the Act
and the Commission's job under it are to require that information be sup-
plied which will enable the investor to arrive at an informed judgment.
Investors will be supplied with the amended prospectus and we can only
urge again that their decision on whether or not to purchase the securities
offered be based on a careful study of the information contained therein.
[26 S.E.C. 263-64.)
The flashlight had certainly been used with diligence, energy, integrity and
courage, but perhaps a flashlight is not an adequate weapon with which to protect
sheep against tigers.
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